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Abstract
Background: Managing emerging vaccine safety signals during an influenza
pandemic is challenging. Federal regulators must balance vaccine risks against
benefits while maintaining public confidence in the public health system.
Methods: We developed a multi-criteria decision analysis model to explore
regulatory decision-making in the context of emerging vaccine safety signals during
a pandemic. We simulated vaccine safety surveillance system capabilities and
used an age-structured compartmental model to develop potential pandemic
scenarios. We used an expert-derived multi-attribute utility function to evaluate
potential regulatory responses by combining four outcome measures into a single
measure of interest: 1) expected vaccination benefit from averted influenza; 2)
expected vaccination risk from vaccine-associated febrile seizures; 3) expected
vaccination risk from vaccine-associated Guillain-Barre Syndrome; and 4) expected
change in vaccine-seeking behavior in future influenza seasons.
Results: Over multiple scenarios, risk communication, with or without suspension
of vaccination of high-risk persons, were the consistently preferred regulatory
responses over no action or general suspension when safety signals were detected
during a pandemic influenza. On average, the expert panel valued near-term
vaccine-related outcomes relative to long-term projected outcomes by 3:1.
However, when decision-makers had minimal ability to influence near-term
outcomes, the response was selected primarily by projected impacts on future
vaccine-seeking behavior.
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PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0115553 December 23, 2014 1/1 7Conclusions: The selected regulatory response depends on how quickly a vaccine
safety signal is identified relative to the peak of the pandemic and the initiation of
vaccination. Our analysis suggested two areas for future investment: efforts to
improve the size and timeliness of the surveillance system and behavioral research
to understand changes in vaccine-seeking behavior.
Introduction
Responding to influenza vaccine safety signals experienced during a pandemic is a
scientific and public policy challenge. Not only must federal decision-makers
balance the immediate consequences of pandemic disease against uncertain
vaccine risks, they also must weigh how federal actions might affect future
vaccine-seeking behavior. For instance, in 1976, after initiating a National
Influenza Immunization Program in response to a localized swine flu outbreak,
federal authorities suspended vaccination after ten weeks because preliminary
surveillance suggested that the incidence of Guillain-Barre Syndrome was
approximately seven-fold greater among vaccinees [1].
Given that this particular swine flu virus was never isolated outside of Fort Dix
[2], the benefit-risk calculus appears simple in hindsight. However, the decision to
initiate and then withdraw a mass vaccination campaign was regarded by some as
a public health failure [3], resulting in sustained and unforeseen consequences on
vaccine-seeking behavior, and loss of public confidence in decision-making.
Firsthand accounts [4–8] and historical assessments [9,10] have emphasized the
difficulty of compressed decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. While
improvements in near real-time vaccine safety surveillance now allow earlier
detection of vaccine safety signals [11,12], the need to act in the context of
scientific uncertainty has not changed.
These circumstances are ripe for simulation and decision models. Recent
pandemic threats and the pandemic potential of H5N1 and H7N9 viruses have
stimulated multiple preparedness efforts [13–15] including scenario-based
mathematical modeling [16,17]. Prior models have focused on influenza
transmission [18,19], optimal vaccine allocation [20–26], social distancing
[27–29], antivirals [30], and layered interventions [31–33]. However, none have
considered regulatory responses to vaccine safety signals emerging during the
course of a mass vaccination program.
We addressed this gap using a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) that
explored regulatory decision-making in the context of emerging vaccine safety
signals experienced during pandemic influenza. Specifically, the MCDA we
developed evaluates the effect of several alternative regulatory responses on the
transmissibility and severity of the pandemic, the burden of adverse events, and
the potential for sustained changes in vaccine-seeking behavior.
Vaccine Safety in a Pandemic Influenza
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Overview
The MCDA included several linked models. First, the vaccine safety signal was
simulated in a model of the surveillance system. Next, this signal and four
potential regulatory responses were the triggering input in a pandemic influenza
transmission model. Each response affected short-term vaccine-associated benefits
and risks (i.e., within the pandemic period), and future vaccine-seeking behavior.
The outputs of the influenza transmission model were inputs to an expert-derived
multi-attribute utility function. The multi-attribute utility function is used to
weight and combine multiple outcomes into a single figure of merit whose
expected value was maximized to select the preferred regulatory decision.
Model of Influenza Vaccination Surveillance System
We simulated surveillance in the Post-licensure Rapid Immunization Safety
Monitoring (PRISM) system, which is currently being tested for influenza vaccine
safety surveillance [34]. We projected 4.3 million adopters of influenza
vaccination in the PRISM system based on prior data. The methodology for the
simulation model is described elsewhere [35] and a detailed description of the
model is in S1 File.
Strength of Vaccine Safety Signals
In each scenario, we evaluated three vaccine safety signals based on historical
precedent: 1) vaccine-associated febrile seizures [36–38], 2) vaccine-associated
Guillain-Barre Syndrome [39,40], and 3) both febrile seizures and Guillain-Barre
Syndrome. We simulated a vaccine-associated febrile seizures effect size as an
incidence risk difference of ,150 excess febrile seizures per 100,000 doses in a
cohort of 0–5 year olds when compared with a historical cohort of seasonal
influenza vaccinees. We simulated a vaccine-associated Guillain-Barre Syndrome
effect size as an incidence risk difference of 40 excess cases of Guillain-Barre
Syndrome per one million doses when compared with a historical cohort of
seasonal influenza vaccinees. We chose these levels of risk because they might
plausibly have escaped detection in clinical trials and thus pose a particular
challenge for decision-makers. We also presumed that vaccine safety signals were
not unique to a single manufacturer or to a specific lot or batch number.
Influenza Transmission Model with Bass Diffusion of Influenza
Vaccine
We adapted an age-structured disease transmission model [24] and added an
influenza vaccination adoption function modeled as a Bass diffusion process while
assuming a universal vaccination policy [41]. Bass diffusion models are commonly
used in the marketing literature to describe the diffusion of innovations [42,43].
A detailed description of the deterministic, compartmental Susceptible-Exposed-
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process are included in S1 File.
Pandemic Influenza Parameters
We characterized influenza epidemics by their transmissibility, severity, and
timing. We used R0, the basic reproduction number, to characterize transmis-
sibility. Severity was measured by influenza morbidity and mortality. Timing
refers to the amount of circulating virus present at the time vaccination began in
the modeled U.S. population. Modeled circulating virus determined whether the
peak of vaccination coverage was likely to precede, run concurrent with, or follow
the peak of influenza transmission.
We implemented two scenarios: mild and severe influenza. The ‘‘mild’’ scenario
was an influenza that had low transmissibility (i.e., R051.4), low severity, and the
peak of vaccination preceded the peak of influenza transmission. The ‘‘severe’’
scenario involved high transmissibility (i.e., R052.0), moderate-to-high severity,
and influenza transmission and vaccination peaked concurrently.
Influenza Vaccine Parameters
We assumed vaccination began September 1. We chose vaccination effectiveness
parameters and expected vaccination coverage based on data observed during the
H1N1 pandemic. Parameter details are in S1 File.
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Model
Simulated Regulatory Responses
When a vaccine safety signal was detected, the MCDA was evaluated using four
simulated regulatory responses: 1) No Action – no communication from the
regulatory agency to the public; 2) Risk Communication Alone – risk
communication issued (e.g., a ‘‘Dear Healthcare Provider’’ letter or website
announcement) that described the vaccine safety signal and identified ‘‘at-risk’’
individuals for a vaccine-associated adverse event but did not recommend changes
in vaccine use; 3) Selective Suspension – risk communication issued and
vaccination suspended in ‘‘at-risk’’ individuals; and 4) General Suspension – risk
communication issued and vaccination suspended for all individuals. These four
responses were an informative sample as the complete range of responses was
beyond the scope of this activity.
The No Action response did not alter vaccine-seeking behavior and universal
vaccination coverage continued as it had before. The Risk Communication Alone
response reduced vaccine-seeking behavior among the ‘‘at risk’’ individuals
targeted in the risk communication. ‘‘At risk’’ individuals were defined as children
age 5 and below for febrile seizures and adults age 50 and above for Guillain-Barre
Syndrome based on historical data associated with these vaccine safety signals
[36–40]. The individuals who were not at highest risk for the adverse event also
reduced their vaccine-seeking behavior by a minor amount during the pandemic
influenza. The Selected Suspension response reduced vaccine-seeking behavior to
Vaccine Safety in a Pandemic Influenza
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by a minor amount during the pandemic influenza. The General Suspension
response reduced vaccine-seeking behavior to zero because the vaccine became
unavailable.
Expert-Derived Multi-Attribute Utility Function
In MCDAs, decisions are characterized by multiple competing criteria, and
decision-makers must consider all criteria when evaluating possible decision
options. A multi-attribute utility function is a mathematical equation used to
characterize the overall value (or ‘‘utility’’) of each decision option relative to the
others based on the specified criteria [44]. We developed an expert-derived
additive multi-attribute utility function to evaluate the MCDA. The four criteria
of interest were: 1) expected vaccination benefit from averted influenza as
measured by a composite index of influenza cases, hospitalizations, and deaths
averted; 2) expected vaccination risk from vaccine-associated febrile seizures as
measured by attributable cases; 3) expected vaccination risk from vaccine-
associated Guillain-Barre Syndrome as measured by attributable cases; and 4)
expected change in vaccine-seeking behavior in future seasons as a consequence of
public reaction to changes in federal vaccination policy during the pandemic. The
first three criteria were directly calculated from the influenza transmission model
and were limited to the pandemic time period. The fourth criterion describes
vaccine-seeking behavior in future seasons. For this criterion, we used a
qualitative variable with three levels: a) no change in future vaccine-seeking
behavior, b) minor change: anticipated 10% reduction in future vaccine-seeking
behavior, and c) major change: anticipated 25% reduction in future vaccine-
seeking behavior. These levels were based on anecdotes related to the 1976 swine
flu experience [4–8] and small studies showing that perceptions about vaccine-
associated adverse events can meaningfully reduce vaccine-seeking behavior [45–
48], but they were not validated by empirical research.
We convened an expert panel of six physicians who were currently serving, or
had previously served, on vaccine-related federal advisory committees to elicit
expert preferences [44,49,50] on prioritization of the four criteria of interest as
shown in Table 1. We performed separate elicitations for the mild and severe
scenarios, thereby creating separate multi-attribute utility functions for the two
situations. We combined each expert panelist’s multi-attribute utility function to
derive the ‘‘average’’ decision-maker. A detailed description of the multi-attribute
utility function elicitation process and result is in S1 File.
Conditional Probability Elicitation
In the MCDA, we were interested in modeling the general public’s reaction to
federal vaccination policy changes and how that reaction translated into vaccine-
seeking behavior in future seasons. We lacked any public preference surveys
similar to those described in [51,52] and therefore, we asked the expert panel to
hypothesize about changes to future vaccine-seeking behavior as a result of
reaction to federal vaccination policy. For example, we asked panelists to describe
Vaccine Safety in a Pandemic Influenza
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behavior, b) reduce it by 10%, or c) reduce it by 25%, if the government received a
vaccine safety signal in the mild scenario and responded with No Action. We
repeated this procedure for both scenarios and all four regulatory responses.
Table 2 lists their averaged probabilities.
All modeling and subsequent analyses were completed using MATLAB and R.
Results
Vaccine Safety Signal Detection
Based on our assumptions of the surveillance system, the febrile seizures signal
was detected most often two months after the start of vaccination whereas the
Guillain-Barre Syndrome signal was detected most often six months after the start
of vaccination (Fig. 1). Statistical power to detect a vaccine safety signal at the
effect size we tested was nearly 100% for febrile seizures and 90% for Guillain-
Barre Syndrome. That is, in 10% of the simulations, the increased risk of vaccine-
associated Guillain-Barre Syndrome was missed.
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Results
The MCDA selected the regulatory responses shown in Table 3 primarily based on
the prioritization, or relative weight, assigned to the four competing criteria by the
expert panel in Table 1. In both scenarios, the average decision-maker valued
near-term vaccine-related outcomes relative to long-term, projected outcomes by
3:1. Table 2 shows how the expert panel linked regulatory responses to those long-
term projections. In particular, General Suspension maximized negative long-
term impacts on vaccine-seeking behavior in the mild scenario whereas No Action
did in the severe scenario. Figs. 2 and 3 are representative instantiations of the
mild and severe scenario respectively and show the near-term vaccine-related
outcomes associated with each regulatory response. Interpreted together,
outcomes in Figs. 2 and 3 are modified by the weight assigned to them in Table 1
and the probability of undesirable long-term effects in Table 2. Fig. 1 represents
Table 1. Averaged Scaling Constants of the Expert Panel for Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis.
Criteria
Expected Vaccination
Benefit
Expected Vaccine-associated
risk from Febrile Seizures
Expected Vaccine-associated risk
from Guillain-Barre Syndrome
Expected Future Change in
Vaccine-Seeking Behavior
Mild Scenario
a 0.55 0.01 0.16 0.28
Severe
Scenario
b
0.664 0.012 0.074 0.250
A scaling constant represents the relative weight given to each criterion in the utility function. Each row must sum to 1.
aThe mild scenario was characterized by low transmissibility, low severity, and the peak of vaccination preceded the peak of influenza transmission.
bThe severe scenario was characterized by high transmissibility, moderate-to-high severity, and the peak of vaccination occurred concurrently with the peak
of influenza transmission.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115553.t001
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Reduction in Vaccine Seeking Behavior
No Change (0%) Minor Change (210%) Major Change (225%)
Mild Scenario
No Action 0.483 0.133 0.383
Risk Communication Alone 0.473 0.227 0.300
Selective Suspension 0.410 0.353 0.237
General Suspension 0.350 0.183 0.467
Severe Scenario
No Action 0.533 0.083 0.383
Risk Communication Alone 0.590 0.190 0.220
Selective Suspension 0.517 0.257 0.227
General Suspension 0.573 0.243 0.183
This criterion, defined with the three levels in the table, links regulatory responses to vaccine-seeking behavior in the long-term. If a particular regulatory
response is selected in the model, then each row represents the probability of the three levels (i.e., note that each row sums to 1.0). Therefore, regulatory
responses with the highest probability of no change are associated with the highest levels of future vaccine-seeking behavior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115553.t002
Fig. 1. Chance of a Vaccine Safety Signal Being Detected over 10,000 Simulations. Left panel is febrile seizures; right panel is Guillain-Barre Syndrome.
For Guillain-Barre Syndrome, the safety signal remains undetected (is missed) 10% of the time. ‘‘o’’ is the median, ‘‘x’’ is the mean, ‘‘*’’ is the 80th percentile.
Other details in S1 File.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115553.g001
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vaccination.
Mild Scenario
In the mild scenario, by the time intervention opportunities occurred with a
probability described in Fig. 1, the peak of vaccination had passed and the indirect
benefits of vaccination had been achieved. Therefore, vaccine associated-benefits
for all regulatory responses except for General Suspension were roughly similar.
Over the multiple intervention opportunities and types of vaccine safety signals in
Table 3, General Suspension was not preferred because of its lower vaccine-related
benefit (see Fig. 2). (Note: the MCDA used a composite index for benefits but we
show saved hospitalizations here.) Also, No Action was not preferred because of
its projected impact on future vaccine-seeking behavior as described in Table 2.
With those regulatory responses eliminated, the MCDA was indifferent between
the remaining two options.
Generally, Risk Communication Alone had marginally higher vaccine-
associated benefit than Selective Suspension (e.g., a difference of ,2000 saved
hospitalizations in Fig. 2), but also had higher vaccine-associated risk (e.g., a
difference of 24 Guillain-Barre Syndrome cases in Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. One simulation run of the mild scenario with a Guillain-Barre Syndrome safety signal received four months after the start of the vaccination
campaign, i.e., January, which is five months after the start of the influenza pandemic scenario. The Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis model selected
Risk Communication Alone or Selective Suspension as the preferred regulatory response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115553.g002
Vaccine Safety in a Pandemic Influenza
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In the severe scenario, intervention opportunities occurred with the same
probability as in the mild scenario, but the timing of peak vaccination coincided
with peak influenza transmission, which meant that decision-makers had almost
no influence on the pandemic’s near-term outcomes (see Fig. 3). With near-term
vaccine-related benefits converging for the four regulatory responses, the MCDA
was driven by projected long-term impacts on future vaccine-seeking behavior. In
other words, with little leverage in the present pandemic, decision-makers focused
on the future. Under these circumstances, the MCDA favored Risk
Communication Alone most consistently over multiple intervention points in
Table 3 because it minimized negative impacts on future vaccine-seeking behavior
as shown in Table 2.
Depending on the month of detection of the vaccine safety signal, the MCDA
was sometimes indifferent between Risk Communication Alone and other options
when a Guillain-Barre Syndrome safety signal was detected. This occurred because
avoided vaccine-associated Guillain-Barre Syndrome cases compensated for
greater negative impacts on future vaccine-seeking behavior. However, the
number of vaccine-associated Guillain-Barre Syndrome cases that offset the
projected negative impact was quite low (e.g. 5 avoided cases). Compensation
Fig. 3. One simulation run of the severe scenario with a febrile seizures safety signal received three months after the start of the vaccination
campaign, i.e., December, which is four months after the start of the influenza pandemic scenario. The outcomes that occur with each of the four
simulated regulatory responses are shown in each panel. The Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis model selected Risk Communication Alone as the preferred
regulatory response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115553.g003
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seizures signal because of the low weight placed on avoided vaccine-associated
febrile seizures.
Sensitivity Analyses
Timing of Vaccination Availability
We varied the availability of vaccination from August 1 (day 1) to November 1
(day 90). In the mild scenario, the decision was unchanged from the results shown
in Table 3, but the logic contributing to the decision did change. In cases when
the timing of vaccine safety signal detection preceded the peak of the influenza
epidemic (February 1), the MCDA was indifferent between Risk Communication
Alone and Selective Suspension because the former was associated with greater
vaccine-associated benefits and greater vaccine-associated risk. However, when
vaccine safety signal detection aligned with the peak of the influenza pandemic,
then vaccine-associated benefits and risks converged among decision options, and
the projected impact on future vaccine-seeking behavior determined the decision.
Unlike in the severe scenario when Risk Communication Alone has the best
projection on this attribute, in the mild scenario, Risk Communication Alone and
Selective Suspension are nearly tied on this attribute and the MCDA is indifferent
among them for this reason.
In the severe scenario, if vaccine is available August 1 at the start of the
pandemic scenario and thus precedes the peak of influenza, Risk Communication
Alone is the preferred decision option for any receipt of a vaccine safety signal. It
performs the best on vaccination-related benefits and projected impacts on future
vaccine-seeking behavior.
Expert Preferences
We recalibrated the multi-attribute utility function with equal prioritization for
the four criteria in Table 1 (i.e., all set to 0.25) and re-ran the mild scenario. Here,
vaccine-associated risk was more important to the decision-maker since its weight
increased from 0.01 to 0.25 for vaccine-associated febrile seizures and 0.16 to 0.25
for vaccine-associated Guillain-Barre Syndrome. However, these adjustments did
not change the projected impact on future vaccine-seeking behavior (i.e., the
probabilities in Table 2), and No Action and General Suspension remained
undesirable. The MCDA consistently preferred Selective Suspension to Risk
Communication Alone regardless of when the safety signal was received because
more weight was assigned to avoiding excess vaccine-related risk.
Vaccine Effectiveness
We also evaluated the MCDA while re-parameterizing the vaccine to be half as
effective. While absolute levels of vaccine associated-risks and benefits changed,
these changes did not affect the relative standing among regulatory responses.
Therefore, the decision was insensitive to the changed parameters.
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We developed an MCDA to evaluate regulatory decision-making following the
emergence of vaccine safety signals and evaluated potential regulatory responses.
The MCDA selected the best relative regulatory response among available choices
according to the averaged, expert-elicited preferences by maximizing the expected
value of the utility of these options. Numerically, the expected values were often
close among options, even though these regulatory responses carry different
logistical, social, and risk communication implications. Over multiple safety signal
timing situations, Risk Communication Alone was consistently the preferred
option in both scenarios, closely followed by Selective Suspension in the mild
pandemic scenario cases only. The preferred decision might change if the multi-
attribute utility function were developed with other stakeholders’ preferences.
Why a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Is Important
The MCDA prompts decision-makers to transparently and explicitly describe the
determinants of their decision-making by weighting multiple competing criteria.
While we present two scenarios herein, the model is flexible enough to be re-run
quickly with multiple sets of differing assumptions to understand which
regulatory responses are robust under numerous circumstances.
Other regulatory agencies have vetted the use of MCDA to aid decision-making
[53]. The general structure of our pandemic influenza MCDA enables regulatory
decision-makers outside of the U.S. to utilize our approach. However, sub-model
components would benefit from enhanced specificity for extension beyond the
U.S. For instance, we chose simulated regulatory responses that are globally
generalizable, but other users might want to precisely tailor the responses to their
country or region. Also, we modeled detection of vaccine safety signals in the U.S.
PRISM medical product safety surveillance system, but other regional medical
product safety surveillance systems would need to be explicitly modeled to
determine their performance in a pandemic context. The multi-attribute utility
function could be adopted, but it could also be re-parameterized using input from
experts in other countries and regions.
What This Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Tells Us
When the near-term benefits and risks of regulatory responses converge, the
MCDA highlighted the weight decision-makers gave to the long-term stability of
vaccination programs. That is, Risk Communication Alone and Selective
Suspension were more desirable because of perceptions that No Action or General
Suspension would have created undesirable effects on future vaccine-seeking
behavior. Timing was critical to the MCDA, particularly the temporal relation-
ships between the influenza epidemic peak, initiation of vaccination, and
detection of the vaccine safety signal. These temporal relationships were most
directly affected by the availability and adoption of vaccine. For example, early
cycle vaccinations (i.e., September or October) had a greater per-vaccination
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or March) because there was higher potential for indirect vaccine-related benefits.
Also important was the vaccine-attributable risk of adverse events. If the vaccine-
attributable risk were higher, then signal detection would likely occur earlier and
decision-makers would have more opportunity to affect near-term (i.e., within the
present pandemic) vaccine-related benefits and risks.
Limitations of the Model
First, the weakest element of the MCDA was the mapping of simulated regulatory
responses to future vaccine-seeking behavior, for which we relied on the expert
panel’s assessment. This element drove decision-making whenever intervention
opportunities occurred too late in the pandemic to influence its near-term
outcomes. Recent work by Blyth et al. [51] suggests that a major reduction in
vaccine-seeking behavior following a selective suspension in a mild scenario might
be more likely than the probability assigned during this exercise. Additionally,
Blyth et al. ’s paper suggests that a ‘‘major reduction’’ in vaccine-seeking behavior
could be modeled as high as 35%. If the probability of a major reduction in
future-vaccine seeking behavior following Selective Suspension in the mild
scenario were higher, then we would expect that Selective Suspension would be a
less desirable option. Consequently, we would expect Risk Communication Alone
to be the preferred decision option in most mild scenarios.
While the present probabilistic assumptions about long-term vaccine-seeking
behavior may be imperfect, we know decision-makers are focused on preserving
the integrity of such behavior. Future studies should ascertain how vaccine safety
guidance or warnings in one influenza season/pandemic affect the public’s
vaccine-seeking behavior during subsequent seasons.
Second, as with any modeling effort, the influenza transmission sub-model and
the surveillance system sub-model required multiple assumptions during
parameterization. The outputs of these models – vaccine-related outcomes and
the timing of signal detection – reflected these assumptions.
Third, within the multi-attribute utility function, we created a composite index
of vaccine-related benefits. Within that index, we weighted all influenza-associated
deaths equally, regardless of age. In the future, it may be preferred to weight
morbidity by age, or to adopt a structure analogous to cumulating quality-
adjusted life years [54].
Fourth, we examined risks and benefits with respect to the entire population.
Future modeling efforts could focus on risks and benefits for subpopulations such
as the elderly, infants or pregnant women.
Fifth, we chose not to model brand-specific risks although vaccine safety
problems in recent years have been attributed to particular products [55]. Future
extensions of the model could make assumptions about the age-specific market
share of various products and model a safety problem that was isolated to a
particular manufacturer.
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Efforts in PRISM
Low attributable risks for rare adverse events pose a significant challenge to any
medical product safety surveillance system. If PRISM can detect safety signals
earlier in a pandemic, then decision-makers will have a greater impact on near-
term vaccine benefits and risks. Opportunities for earlier detection necessitate
increasing sample size early in a pandemic. This can be accomplished by
encouraging earliest possible vaccination within a pandemic period or season,
adding additional electronic healthcare databases to the PRISM system to increase
the number of vaccinees under surveillance, and accessing the existing PRISM
databases more frequently (e.g., using a weekly update instead of a monthly
update) [56].
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